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INTRODUCTION 
August 20, 1968 was a fateful date in the history of Czechoslovakia.  That night, 
armies from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria launched a 
surprise invasion to suppress the country’s process of liberalization known as “socialism 
with a human face.”  August 20 also was a date of importance to President Lyndon B. 
Johnson of the United States.  The President was making final preparations for a nuclear 
arms limitation summit meeting with the Soviet leaders that he was going to announce 
the following day.  Throughout his presidency, Johnson had been working to achieve 
what he hoped would amount to an eventual peace between the Eastern and Western 
worlds.  He made promoting détente a priority, and endeavored to uphold and expand 
upon an American policy that supported and encouraged freedom and democracy in the 
East.  Now at the end of his term, Johnson was growing more optimistic about achieving 
a major breakthrough with the Soviet Union.  He believed that the conflict in Vietnam 
was going to tarnish his legacy, and he desperately wanted to end his presidency with a 
major international success.  As it turned out though, the attack on Czechoslovakia forced 
the postponement and ultimate cancelation of Johnson’s hopes and plans.  The news of 
the invasion took the White House by surprise, even though there had been ample 
intelligence suggesting that such a move by the Warsaw Pact was quite possible.   
President Johnson was so caught up in the Vietnam conflict, and focused on his 
efforts at détente and improving his legacy, that when he was told of the invasion, he 
responded with those factors in mind.  When he undertook action, he made sure to 
orchestrate only a minimal rhetorical response that in no way threatened his personal or 
political goals.  The official response from the White House, however, differed from the 
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response by other political circles and the public.  The U.S Congress and American 
public largely responded with outrage, and called for firm and decisive action against the 
invaders.  The President and his staff chose to follow a different path.  Instead of listening 
to the desires of many in the country and government, or of following the trend of 
American support for freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe, Johnson decided upon 
a path that would minimize confrontation with the East.  In doing so, he demonstrated 
that the invasion of Czechoslovakia, at least within the broader aspects of the Cold War, 
was just simply not that important.   
Johnson, for better or worse, was focused on furthering relations with the Soviets 
during his last days in office.  Whether out of his concern for peace and détente, or for 
improving his legacy, Lyndon Johnson did nothing to upset the Soviets.  As a result, the 
U.S. government lent no assistance to Czechoslovakia, and did not push either its NATO 
allies or the United Nations to help.  The Czechoslovak crisis quickly faded from the 
world stage, but the lessons regarding America’s actions, or lack thereof, were clear.  The 
White House demonstrated that it was willing to abandon many of the country’s morals 
and principles, and seek the path of acquiescence, nonresistance and reticence.  The result 
was that the United States failed to act in a way that most felt was appropriate, damaging 
the country’s desire for a reputation as a steadfast defender of democracy.   
 
U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY UP TO LYNDON JOHNSON 
In order to understand how the United States’ reaction to the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 could be considered deficient, one must examine America’s 
early Cold War policies and rhetoric as they related to democracy in Eastern Europe.  
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America lost much of its influence in Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union during and 
following World War II, but it nonetheless ardently continued to uphold a doctrine that 
advocated social and political freedom, and liberal democracy.  Clearly geared towards 
countering both the threats of fascism and communism, American policy maintained 
strong democratic principles.  Before the United States formally entered WWII, the 
country made clear its position in the Atlantic Charter in August of 1941.  Towards the 
end of the conflict, the United States worked to include the Declaration of Liberated 
Europe into the proceedings of the 1945 Yalta Conference.  Even after Eastern Europe 
had become a bastion of Soviet influence, the United States clung to its rhetoric about 
liberalism and freedom, and made these positions in the peace treaties that it signed in 
February of 1947 with Romania and Bulgaria.  Several presidential doctrines, speeches 
by politicians, formal policy decrees, and actual physical actions made clear the United 
States’ level of commitment to its stated ideals of liberal democracy.  This helped create 
an important precedent for words and actions that would, in 1956 and 1968, become 
obvious not because of its continuance, but because of its absence. 
 The Atlantic Charter, declared in August of 1941, was an agreement between 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill that set forth the 
basic principles that the two parties agreed would guide their foreign policies.  The 
United States illustrated its early commitment to the freedom of Europe by stating in the 
Charter’s third point that U.S. policy would ensure “the right of all peoples to choose the 
form of government under which they will live.”   The third point also emphasized the 
importance of “sovereign rights and self government,” and of the restoration of those 
things “to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”  Additionally, the Atlantic 
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Charter’s sixth point stated that it was the desire of the United States to see that “all 
nations [have] the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and… that all 
the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom.”1  By taking such a stance, the 
Atlantic Charter laid the foundation for future agreements and protocols, and served to 
solidify the position of the United States vis-à-vis Europe. 
 Another significant example of America’s commitment to liberty in Europe came 
in February of 1945 during the Yalta Conference.  However, even prior to that, Secretary 
of State Edward R. Stettinius in November of 1944 again reiterated the United States’ 
position on the future of Europe, and Eastern Europe in particular, when he told President 
Roosevelt that political, social, economic, and cultural concerns were of primary 
importance.2  Cognizant of this fact, Roosevelt entered Yalta, and left with a “Declaration 
on Liberated Europe.”  This declaration, similar to the Atlantic Charter, clearly 
emphasized American commitment to freedom.  It stated that Europe’s newly liberated 
nations would be able “to create democratic institutions of their own choice” and restore 
their sovereign rights.  Furthermore, it committed the Allies to (a) establish conditions of 
internal peace, (b) provide emergency relief, (c) form interim governments pledged to the 
ideal of free elections, and (d) if necessary, help facilitate such elections.3  Thus, one of 
the results of the Yalta Conference was not only a reaffirmed and re-strengthened 
American commitment to the democratic future of Eastern Europe, but an actual 
indication that, if necessary, direct action may be taken to ensure a free and liberated 
Europe.  
                                                
1. The Avalon Project, “Atlantic Charter,” Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/ 
atlantic.asp  (accessed April 6, 2010). 
2. Bennett Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 14-15. 
3. The Avalon Project, “The Yalta Conference,” Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/ 
yalta.asp (accessed April 6, 2010). 
Roth 6 
 The terms of the formal peace treaties with Romania and Bulgaria, both of which 
were ratified on February 10, 1947, are some of the last examples of American 
commitment to freedom in Eastern Europe during the period immediately following 
World War II.  Part II, Section I, Article II, of the peace treaty with Bulgaria stipulated 
that the country “shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons… fundamental 
freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious 
worship, of political opinion and of public meeting.”4  Part II, Section I, Article III, of the 
peace treaty between the United States and Romania required the same thing, in addition 
to the assurances of the rights of Romania’s minorities.5  The American insistence upon 
such wording, and the fact that it was placed very early on in the treaties, implies that 
even after the Iron Curtain had fallen on Eastern Europe, the United States, at least 
rhetorically, remained committed to upholding the principles of freedom and democracy.  
In fact, the United States would not even consider ratifying the treaties unless the two 
countries held free elections.  As a result, American policy and rhetoric during the years 
surrounding World War II helped to establish the precedent of a determined commitment 
to Eastern Europe’s freedom.  However, the postwar period demonstrated the limits of 
American power.  Ironically, it was in Romania and Bulgaria that the United States 
proved that it was not ready to intervene on behalf of freedom and justice.  U.S. support 
for anti-communist leaders led to their arrest, show trials, and (in Bulgaria) execution.  
The U.S. government remained silent during these actions.  This sad instance of 
abandonment clearly illustrated a disconnect between the United States’ rhetoric and 
                                                
4. The Avalon Project, “Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria: 10 February 1947,” Yale Law School, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu012.asp (accessed April 6, 2010). 
5. The Avalon Project, “Treaty of Peace with Romania: 10 February 1947,” Yale Law School, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu011.asp (accessed April 6, 2010). 
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actions, and that a shameful “failure of nerve” had occurred in Washington.6  
Nevertheless, the government retained its overall commitment to the liberty of Eastern 
Europe, and made clear that this commitment would not end after the post-war 
settlements.  Rather, it would continue to be a major component of American diplomacy 
and propagate itself in doctrines, speeches, policies, and actions over the coming years 
and even decades.   
 The U.S. government repeatedly expressed, both in the tenets of formal doctrines, 
and in general speeches, its commitment to the independence of the Eastern Europeans.  
For example, the Truman Doctrine in 1947 made clear that the strategy of the United 
States was to “support free peoples who are resisting… subjugation.”  Furthermore, the 
doctrine said that it would be official policy to assist “peoples [in working] out their own 
destinies in their own way,” and that this was important, because it was “the free peoples 
of the world [who] look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.”7  Secretary of 
State George C. Marshall’s speech at Harvard in 1947 contained not only promises of 
economic assistance to Europe, but also a stern message to those who would “perpetuate 
human misery… politically or otherwise,” warning that they would “encounter the 
opposition of the United States.”8   
In 1951, a Republican congressional representative from Wisconsin exclaimed, 
“we will do everything we can to work for [Eastern Europe’s] eventual liberation,” 
                                                
6. Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, Return to Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 113, 118.  
7. The Avalon Project, “Truman Doctrine.” Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ 
trudoc.asp (accessed April 8, 2010). 
8. USAID, “Marshall Plan.” http://www.usaid.gov/multimedia/video/marshall/marshallspeech.html 
(accessed April 11, 2010).  
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including “actually assist[ing]” with it.9  General Dwight D. Eisenhower espoused similar 
rhetoric as well, during his presidential campaign in 1952, when he advocated a “more 
dynamic foreign policy which… will endeavor to bring about the liberation of the 
enslaved peoples” of Eastern Europe.10  In the sixth point of Eisenhower’s January 5, 
1957 speech to Congress that would become the basis for his doctrine, he said that 
“political independence” of nations must be protected, while later affirming yet again that 
the United States must make manifest its commitment to the “support of freedom,” and 
“independence of every nation.”11  Even years later, President John F. Kennedy pledged 
in his inaugural address “to assure the survival and the success of liberty,” and to be 
responsible for “defending freedom.”12  These repeated and vociferous comments about 
freedom, liberty, and the support of the United States government in pursuing such goals, 
clearly demonstrated—at the very least verbally and symbolically—a commitment by 
America not to stand idly by when freedom and self-determination was threatened.  As it 
actually turns out, often times such rhetoric did become policy and the U.S. took actions 
to support and defend freedom in Eastern Europe.   
 One of the earliest post-war examples of U.S. assistance to anti-communist forces 
fighting for freedom came in the form of economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey 
in 1947.  Although these countries were not yet under Soviet control, and were within the 
Western sphere of influence as prescribed by the Percentage Agreement, the Truman 
administration nonetheless decided to reinforce its words with actions, and bolstered 
                                                
9. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Mutual Security Program: Hearings, 
82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, pp.1106-9, as quoted in Kovrig, 46.    
10. "Liberation Pledge Affirmed by G.O.P." New York Times, October 5, 1952, 
 http://www.proquest.com (accessed April 9, 2010).  
11. The Modern History Sourcebook, “Eisenhower Doctrine,” Fordham University, 
http://www.fordham. edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html (accessed April 8, 2010). 
12. The Avalon Project, “Inaugural Address of John F. Kennedy,” Yale Law School, 
http://avalon.law.yale. edu/20th_century/kennedy.asp (accessed April 8, 2010). 
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those two countries’ democratic regimes.13  Such action demonstrated that the United 
States was capable of, and prepared to, assist friendly forces at least in communist-
threatened, if not communist-controlled states.  Because the support for Greece and 
Turkey proved to be an important early success, it would serve as a basis for future 
strategies and policies, many of which would help to define the United States’ diplomacy 
towards Eastern Europe in the following decade. 
Soon after the Greek and Turkish assistance programs, American rhetoric found 
its way into official policy recommendations, demonstrating that there could be an 
explicit link between rhetoric and action.  In March of 1948, the National Security 
Council (NSC) urged the U.S. to “develop and… carry out a coordinated campaign to 
support underground resistance movements in countries behind the Iron Curtain.”14  
Furthermore, in August of that year, the government elaborated upon its aims to include 
the reduction of Soviet power and influence from the satellite countries either by direct or 
indirect activity, or by challenging Soviet prestige.15  By December of 1949, the National 
Security Council had gone as far as suggesting that the United States “do what it can… 
particularly through covert operations and propaganda, to keep alive the anti-communist 
sentiment… in the satellite countries.”16 
Often, such recommendations proved not to be mere aggrandizement.  In June of 
1948, the Central Intelligence Agency established the Office of Policy Coordination 
(OPC) to carry out “propaganda, [and] economic warfare; preventive direct action, 
                                                
13. Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges, 28. 
14. NSC 7, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism,” 
March 30, 1948, as quoted in Kovrig, 32.   
15. Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges, 32 
16. NSC 58/2, “United States Policy Toward the satellite states in Eastern Europe,” December 8, 1949, 
as quoted in Kovrig, 33. 
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including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion 
against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, 
guerillas, and refugee liberation groups.”  The only stipulation attached to such actions 
was that the government be able to “plausibly disclaim” any responsibility.17  Notable 
OPC actions included airdrops of arms, radios, and money into Poland, the military 
recruitment and training of Eastern European émigrés, and a (failed) five-year long 
attempt to instigate revolution in Albania.  Although the CIA and OPC never achieved 
regime change, they did manage to partially infiltrate the Iron Curtain and carry out 
actions intended to maintain the Western sympathies of many of those living in 
communist countries.  These attempts, along with psychological, informational, and non-
traditional forms of warfare, were marginally successful, showing that the prospects of 
American assistance remained present.18 
In the early 1950s, the American government was still pursuing a policy of 
rollback, and trying to undermine communist regimes wherever possible.  To do this 
more effectively, the country began to utilize non-traditional forms of warfare, which 
included the use of propaganda.  Certainly, one of the largest, most influential, and most 
well-known components of American propaganda warfare during the Cold War was 
Radio Free Europe (RFE).  Although many of the contemporary RFE sources are biased 
and triumphalist, they nonetheless provide valuable stories and insights into the 
organization’s activities.  Beginning in the early 1950s, the radio’s mission was to inform 
Eastern European listeners about events and issues not covered by their communist-run 
media outlets, and ultimately to bring about the liberation of Eastern Europe by enabling 
                                                
17. NSC 10/2, “Office of Special Operations,” June 18, 1948, as quoted in Kovrig, 39.  
18. Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges, 43-45.    
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the demise of the communist system.  19  Funded by the Central Intelligence Agency with 
much of its programming dictated to it by the State Department, RFE and its affiliates 
engaged in a number of subversive actions.  Frequently, the intent of these actions was to 
disrupt communist regimes and foster discontent among the civilian populations living 
behind the Iron Curtain.  Czechoslovakia, for both political and geographic reasons, was 
many times a primary target for RFE, and experienced a great deal of attention.   
Perhaps surprisingly, Radio Free Europe did not carry out many of its earliest and 
most prominent activities over the airways.  Instead, RFE along with two sister 
organizations, the Free Europe Press and the Crusade for Freedom, organized an 
ambitious project that utilized large weather balloons to drop leaflets deep inside the Iron 
Curtain.  Czechoslovakia was the primary target, due to its geographical location.  
Between 1951 and 1956, hundreds of thousands of these balloons “flew” towards 
Czechoslovakia “carrying messages of freedom” and insulting communist leaders.  
Intended to amount to “a psychological warfare action program,” these operations also 
had the goal of “coordinating and inspiring popular opposition to communism.”  The 
balloons were ignored at first by the authorities, but when the messages become more 
aggressive in nature, anger amongst the communist leaders grew.  The Czechoslovak 
government dispatched MiG fighter jets to shoot down as many of the balloons as 
possible, and ordered anti-aircraft artillery to fire on them as well.  Police did their best to 
confiscate any leaflets that made it through, and the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry 
issued formal complaints to the U.S. Department of State.20  In light of the perceived 
positive effects of the balloon operations, RFE and its affiliates began to change their 
                                                
19. Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 
2000), ix.  
20. Ibid., 61-64.  
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message and become more assertive.  Operation Veto in 1954 was an instance of direct 
political action in which RFE attempted to influence the Czechoslovak elections 
occurring at that time.  The operation heavily emphasized the motto of “liberation 
through liberalization,” and by speaking as the “voice of the opposition,” Radio Free 
Europe attempted to involve itself directly in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia and 
create tangible change from within.21  Eventually, the balloon program was abandoned.  
Fears of disrupting commercial airplanes, the program’s rising costs, and most 
importantly, a feeling among the RFE leadership that the balloons were detracting from 
the main broadcasting goals of the station, led to their retirement.22  Although now solely 
a broadcasting entity, Radio Free Europe’s balloon operations were significant examples 
of the United States’ government’s continued policies of actively trying to provoke 
change in Eastern Europe, and constituted a continued adherence to America’s previous 
efforts and tactics at supporting Eastern European dissidents.       
In the years leading up to the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion, the radio’s 
Czechoslovak branch attempted to serve as “propaganda” directed at “common people, 
intellectuals, and party members.”  Closely monitored by the State Department, RFE 
acted as the official voice for government-sanctioned content.  However, that did not 
mean that such content was lacking in pro-democracy and pro-freedom rhetoric.  
American policy and guidance for the Czechoslovak branch in the 1950s and early 1960s 
encouraged broadcasts that promoted “freedom from communism.”  Furthermore, the 
radio aired programs meant to “foster… revolutionary development[s] resulting in… the 
attainment of national independence.”  It is important to note, however, that the 
                                                
21. Allan A. Michie, Voices Through the Iron Curtain: The Radio Free Europe Story (New York: 
Dodd, Mead & Co., 1963), 135-136, 144.  
22. Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom, 72.  
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government supporters of the radio were very careful to ensure that the émigré and 
individual interests of the actual broadcasters did not hijack the programming.23  Because 
many broadcasters were political or cultural exiles, the government needed to make sure 
that the radios represented its views, and not theirs.  Given that regard, the radio’s 
programming was probably more conservative and cautiously laid back than it would 
have otherwise been, preventing an even stronger display of support for democracy. 
Nonetheless, as late as 1965, and even after President Johnson’s efforts to tone 
down American rhetoric in favor of promoting détente and closer U.S.-Soviet ties, Radio 
Free Europe still set forth a broadcast strategy that emphasized “a total transition to 
democracy,” and the “growth of reform sentiment” within the Czechoslovak Communist 
Party.24  Like the previous examples of U.S. support for democracy and freedom in 
Eastern Europe, Radio Free Europe served as a tool for that end.  Secretly funded for 
much of its history by the CIA, the radio was a release for American propaganda and 
rhetoric.  Acting as a continuous example of America’s efforts to support change in 
communist countries, RFE in many ways epitomized American rhetorical and moral 
support for anti-communists, in addition to acting as an important medium of cultural and 
informational exchange. 
However, the 1950s was not a period marked by unwavering support for Eastern 
European dissenters.  The U.S. government again confirmed that despite a strong 
rhetorical commitment to democracy, it at times avoided firm action.  Just as the U.S. 
abandoned Romanian and Bulgarian leaders following the ratification of the peace 
treaties, so too did it largely abandon the Hungarians in October of 1956.  Displaying an 
                                                
23. Ibid., 118-120.  
24. Ibid., 146.  
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inconsistency that would manifest itself again later in 1968, the State Department, White 
House, and CIA encouraged and “kept alive the yearning for freedom” in Hungary until 
the Soviet army intervened, at which point the U.S. was, in the words of Allen Dulles, 
“caught napping and doing nothing.”25  Because such inaction was so contrary to what 
the U.S. had been saying, both directly by politicians, and indirectly through organs such 
as RFE, and because the U.S. failed to respond in what many hoped would be a 
constructive manner, “a barrage of criticism” was leveled upon the government.  Such 
criticism forced not only internal reviews and investigations of the conduct of agencies 
such as the State Department, RFE, and CIA, but substantive policy revisions that in the 
years to come would reframe the perspective through which the United States acted with 
regard to promoting liberation in Eastern Europe.  Although policies and actions would 
become less overt and confrontational in the hopes of avoiding a repeat of the violence 
that struck Hungary, unfortunately, that country was not the last example of a disconnect 
between what the U.S. government promised versus what it actually delivered.26  
Czechoslovakia in 1968 would face many of the same discontinuities of policy and 
action, and like Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, it faced abandonment and the harsh 
realization that pro-democracy rhetoric and actions did not translate into tangible 
American support when it was needed.             
 
LYNDON JOHNSON’S POLICIES TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE 
After Lyndon Baines Johnson assumed the office of President of the United States 
in 1963, the country accelerated a shift in its policies and priorities for Eastern Europe 
                                                
25. Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges, 89-90.   
26. Ibid., 101-102.   
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that began after Hungary’s 1956 revolution.  Johnson continued to provide cultural and 
political support for the region, but hastened the shift of American policy away from 
much of the bellicosity of previous administrations.  The President began to guide the 
country down a path that he hoped would lead to détente and a warming of relations 
between the United States and the communist countries of Europe.  Because his “goal in 
Europe and elsewhere [was] a just and secure peace,” Johnson tried to alleviate much of 
the tension and mistrust that existed between the two blocks.27  However, this trend did 
not mean that he and the United States abandoned efforts at undermining communism or 
spreading democracy and freedom.  Such support and rhetoric still existed, albeit in a 
more veiled and less overt manner.  Instead of ordering the CIA to airdrop weapons 
behind the Iron Curtain as previous administrations had done, Johnson initiated a 
program that he called bridge building.  It was his hope that this program would not only 
bring about better East-West ties, but the eventual end of communist control as well.          
Bridge building was largely a product of the revised approach to Eastern Europe 
that the United States was forced to take following the Soviet repression of Hungary’s 
1956 revolution.  The United States revamped its foreign policies and their methods of 
implementation after that revolution because many accused the United States of being 
“paralyzed by inaction,” and of having “misrepresent[ed] its commitment to rollback” 
and the freedom of Eastern Europe.28  Realizing the danger of encouraging but then not 
actually assisting or supporting reformers, America began to focus on the promotion of 
liberalization within communist countries, as opposed to violent revolution or covert 
                                                
27. “Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task,” (address given by President Johnson October 7, 
1966) U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, October 24, 1966, 625, HeinOnline, http://www.heinonline. org. 
proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/dsbul55&id= 1&size =2&collection= journals 
&index=journals/dsbul#624 (accessed March 12, 2010).  
28. Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges, 101-105.   
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activities.  Engagement, economic and cultural outreach, and geopolitics replaced CIA-
sponsored attempts at revolution.  However, the United States remained “doctrinally 
unwilling to accept the permanence of Soviet rule over Eastern Europe.”29  In both its 
rhetoric and actions, the U.S. continued to “assure the satellite peoples of the continuing 
interest of the United States in the… restoration of their independence and political 
freedom.”30  Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State for both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 
reiterated in 1963 that “we would like to do what we can to encourage [nationalism, 
reform, and freedom] within the communist world.”31 
Thus, it should not come as a surprise that the notion of a formalized bridge 
building came about in May 1964 during a speech given by President Johnson in 
Lexington, Virginia.  During that address, the President declared that the United States 
would “build bridges across the Gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe,” and 
that they would be “bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors and of humanitarian 
aid.”32  President Johnson hoped that this initiative would not only “open avenues of 
political, economic, and cultural contact with Eastern Europe,” but that bridge building in 
the long-run might even undermine communist ideology and authority.33  National 
Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 304 in June of 1964 ordered the State 
Department to transform these “recommendations [of] statement of policy into specific 
                                                
29. Ibid.  
30. NSC 5707/8, “Basic National Security Policy,” June 3, 1957, as quoted in Kovrig, 105.  
31. Department of State, Bulletin, October 28, 1963, 656-657.   
32. “National Security Action Memorandum No. 304,” June 3, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United 
States (hereafter cited as FRUS), vol. 17, Eastern Europe, doc. 4.  
33. Frank Costigliola, “LBJ, Germany, and ‘the End of the Cold War,’” in Lyndon Johnson Confronts 
the World: American Foreign Policy 1963-1968, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 193. 
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action programs,” to be implemented in Czechoslovakia and other countries.34  As 
understood by the Department of State: 
 
[The United States’] basic purpose in building bridges to East Europe is to 
facilitate and sustain… (1) internal liberalization; (2) establishment of a 
certain degree of national independence from Soviet control; (3) pragmatic 
innovations designed to cope with pressing economic problems; and (4) 
progress in reassociation with the West… We seek thereby progress 
toward the realization of our ultimate objective in East Europe, that is: the 
establishment of conditions under which the people of each country may 
determine its own society; and where each country may enjoy national 
independence, security, and a normal relationship with all other countries. 
This will mean the final dismantling of the Iron Curtain and the free 
association of East Europe and the West.35  
 
NSAM 352, and many of the President’s speeches, reconfirmed bridge building, and by 
the summer of 1966, it was well underway.36  Thus, it is clear that the President’s policy 
did not aim to abandon its support for Eastern Europeans.  Rather, it simply devised a 
new way in which to carry out its objectives, albeit one differing in notable ways from 
past policies.   
                                                
34. “National Security Action Memorandum No. 304.” 
35. “Paper Prepared in the Department of State,” undated, FRUS, vol. 17, Eastern Europe, doc. 12.    
36. Thomas A. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), 210.  
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Although bridge building encompassed all the Eastern European communist 
states, including the Soviet Union, a significant portion of its resources directly targeted 
Czechoslovakia.  It was in the implementation of these components that a continuity, 
albeit somewhat altered one, from the previous actions of the past twenty years emerged.  
With bridge building, the United States’ officials were not as explicitly promoting radical 
reform or revolution as they did in the late 1940s and early 1950s, nor were they taking 
the same approach that Radio Free Europe often took in promoting freedom.  However, 
the United States government clearly continued its involvement with Czechoslovak 
society, and still agitated for change.  Even with the more placatory bridge building, the 
administration was still lending its support to reformers, and still very much involved 
with the actions and consequences of events in Czechoslovakia. 
Because Czechoslovakia was “one of [the] more attractive opportunities” for 
bridge building, the Department of State began early on to implement its outreach 
program there.  Some of the earliest Czechoslovak initiatives came in 1964, and 
concerned increasing economic and financial agreements that would allow for more trade 
and cultural exchange, along with the negotiation of a new consular convention that 
would permit the Czechoslovaks to expand their diplomatic presence in the United 
States.37  By December of that year, concrete examples of the effects of bridge building 
had emerged.  The Czechoslovak State Airline, Československé Aerolinea had inquired 
about leasing Boeing 707, DC-8, and DC-9 aircraft from the United States, as opposed to 
purchasing Soviet-made Ilyushin IL-62s.  U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Jacob 
Beam urged approval of the deal, as did members of the State Department, given its 
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ideological significance.38  Such instances of communist outreach demonstrated the 
potential success of bridge building in undermining the Soviet’s grip upon the region, and 
led to the furthering and intensification of the process.    
Soon after this initial outreach, cultural exchange began to take place as well.  In 
1965, the American poet Allen Ginsberg, was embraced by Czechoslovak students, and 
elected king of their annual Majáles student festival—a significant occurrence 
demonstrating the affability of many Czechoslovaks to America and American culture.39  
An escalation of such sentiment seemingly occurred as well, as Prague theaters began to 
produce works by Western authors, cross-cultural censorship was eased, American 
professors and academics were invited to Czechoslovakia to give lectures, and tourism 
both to and from the West greatly increased.40  Two prominent American economists, 
Gregory Grossman from the University of California and Dean William from Cornell 
University, visited Czechoslovakia and shared ideas with their Czechoslovak 
counterparts.41  Yet another instance of cultural exchange took place in the early summer 
of 1968 when the U.S. Department of Commerce hosted a management-marketing 
seminar for 200 Czechoslovaks to “compare American management methods with the 
workers councils concept.”  As it turned out, the Czechoslovak’s views “closely 
paralleled those of American businessmen.”42  Further signs of improving cultural 
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relations emerged when Washington allowed Czechoslovakia to open a consulate and 
commercial office in New York, and engage in more cultural outreach activities.43   
Bridge building also helped to influence economic issues as well.  In 1967, the 
Czechoslovak government turned to the United States and the Export-Import Bank as a 
means of obtaining capital.44  Furthermore, talks over a longstanding dispute concerning 
the return of Czechoslovak gold seized by the Nazis and then captured by the United 
States at the end of World War II showed signs of improving.  April of 1968 witnessed 
renewed efforts by both sides to resolve the issue, with Ambassador Beam even willing 
to accept the Czechoslovak terms.  Although the two sides nearly reached a settlement, 
the fact that any agreement would require Congressional approval eventually forestalled 
any rapprochement.  Moreover, the U.S. Congress proved to be a stumbling block 
regarding the White House’s proposed granting of “most favored nation” (MFN) status to 
Czechoslovakia.  MFN would have allowed for much freer trade between the two 
countries, and it would have eliminated U.S. imposed import tariffs on Czechoslovak 
goods.  Again, Ambassador Beam and other officials urged that Czechoslovakia be 
granted this status, especially since countries like Poland and Romania enjoyed it, but 
ultimately to no avail (Congress was unwilling at that point to make concessions without 
the promise of tangible gains).  The United States did however make one significant 
economic concession.  In June of 1968, the Department of the Treasury removed 
Czechoslovakia from its “Circular 665” listing.  This action released $5 million worth of 
benefits payments to former American citizens who immigrated to, and were now living 
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in Czechoslovakia, and helped improve the prospects for future economic agreements.45  
These economic achievements, along with the other cultural contacts and exchanges, 
demonstrated that ties to and support for Czechoslovakia could bring about important 
gains in these fields.  Furthermore, an enhanced political rapprochement had the 
possibility of progressing détente, and even helping to undermine Soviet control. 
Although bridge building signified a new approach in America’s outreach and 
treatment of the Eastern European countries, the United States was still ideologically, 
doctrinally, and diplomatically committed to undermining communism.  President 
Johnson adopted largely non-political avenues of resistance, but overall, the United States 
only modified, not discontinued, its earlier practices and policies.  In Czechoslovakia 
especially, the American actions were prominent and often times highly visible.  The 
continuity of American support and rhetoric was evident and clearly established.  It was 
only well into 1968, and on the eve of the Warsaw Pact invasion, that all of this changed.     
  
THE INVASION AND THE WHITE HOUSE 
The end of 1967 and beginning of 1968 was a very tumultuous time for the people 
of Czechoslovakia.  Alexander Dubček was the new head of the Communist Party, and 
soon began instituting liberal reforms dubbed as “socialism with a human face.”  
Although the White House was aware of these developments, it decided not to involve 
itself.  At this point, President Johnson was late in his final term, and beginning to work 
fervently towards détente.  He was very concerned about not angering or alienating the 
Soviets.  Secretary of State Rusk agreed, thinking it best not to do anything to jeopardize 
the President’s foreign policy goals.  Therefore, they decided not to “tinker with [the 
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Czechoslovak developments] in any way.”  Rusk later elaborated by saying “This is a 
matter for the Czechs first and foremost.  Apart from that, it is a matter for the Czechs 
and other nations of the Warsaw Pact.”46  As a result, Washington ignored real 
democratic change in Czechoslovakia.  This pre-invasion neglect by the White House is 
very significant.  For the first time, Johnson demonstrated that his own political desires 
and goals were more important than continuing America’s precedent of support for 
democracy in Eastern Europe.  The beginnings of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia 
ironically marked the beginnings of America’s inaction in the country.  However, those 
inactions would not fully manifest themselves until after the Warsaw Pact occupied 
Czechoslovakia.          
When the armies of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and 
Bulgaria invaded Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20, 1968, the event was, as 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk said, “like throwing a dead fish in the face of the President 
of the United States.”47  The invasion took President Lyndon Johnson and much of his 
staff by surprise, and left them in a state of near paralysis.  Although individuals within 
the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and other organizations had been 
warning about a possible invasion of Czechoslovakia, President Johnson largely ignored 
such predictions.  Perhaps then, it was these overlooked warnings that first illustrated the 
failure of President Johnson’s response to the invasion. 
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Although the Warsaw Pact’s actions on August 20 caught many in the Johnson 
administration off guard, there had been ample evidence, intelligence, and discussion to 
prove that this should not have been the case.  As early as 1964, a national intelligence 
estimate from the CIA warned that “the Soviets would consider direct military 
intervention in Eastern Europe… when they believed vital Soviet interest to be 
threatened.”48  Years later, during the beginning of the Prague Spring, Deputy Under 
Secretary of State Charles Bohlen expressed concerns that the liberal reform in 
Czechoslovakia would go too far and provoke some kind of Soviet response.  Secretary 
of Defense Clark Clifford concurred, and raised the question as to whether a response by 
the Soviets would resort to the use of military force to quash Czechoslovak reforms.49  
Bohlen even authored a lengthy memo to Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach 
that discussed the prudence of contingency planning, and listed several possible courses 
of action to take should a military invasion occur.  Although he advised that the 
government use “discretion” and quiet diplomacy so as not to upset the Soviets, he also 
advocated for the continuation of bridge building and the improvement of East-West 
relations with the hope that in doing so a conflict could be avoided.50  In July 1968, as 
events progressed and became more serious, the CIA warned that the Soviet Union had 
deployed its armies to many of the Warsaw Pact countries bordering Czechoslovakia, and 
that “great pressures are being exerted… to prepare for an intervention.”51  NATO also 
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realized that there was a high probability the Soviets would invade, and began to discuss 
consequences and possible responses.52  Even the American Ambassador in Moscow, 
Llewellyn Thompson, warned of the Soviet military preparations, and the high likelihood 
of an invasion of Czechoslovakia.53  However, aside from some very basic and 
preliminary contingency planning, the White House did not take firm action in response 
to these assessments.  CIA director Richard Helms was so frustrated with the 
lackadaisical attitude taken by the President and his top advisors regarding preparing for, 
or even seriously considering the possibility of a Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, that he said his attempts at persuading them to take developments 
seriously “were as futile as (in his words) ‘peeing up a rope.’”54 
 By the time the President realized that he and his administration were 
underprepared to deal with an invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet tanks already occupied 
that country.  August 20 may have started out as one of President Johnson’s happiest 
days—the next morning the United States and Soviet Union were going to announce the 
beginning of arms limitation talks, an accomplishment sure to be one of Johnson’s major 
détente successes—but the day ended on a devastating note.55  Earlier that morning, the 
Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, received the text of a message 
from Moscow that announced and explained the Warsaw Pact invasion.  Ordered to 
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deliver the message to President Johnson between 6:00 PM and 8:00 PM, the ambassador 
contacted Walt Rostow, Johnson’s National Security Advisor, and requested an audience 
with the President.  At 8:00 PM Dobrynin entered the cabinet room of the White House 
to deliver his statement.56  Although the Ambassador had made clear that the message 
was “urgent,” and that Rostow thought (correctly) that it could very well be related to the 
situation in Czechoslovakia, Johnson remained unconcerned.57  When the meeting began, 
Johnson started talking about a movie he had recently seen at his ranch in Texas.  Soon 
after, the conversation shifted to of all things, President Johnson’s haircut, his personal 
health, and to the fact that he “had to lose some weight.”  It was only after all of 
Johnson’s banal small talk that Ambassador Dobrynin was actually able to get around to 
delivering his statement on the invasion.  After reading the message about “rendering 
necessary assistance to the Czechoslovak people,” and claiming that the Czechoslovak 
government had “invited” the Warsaw Pact forces, Dobrynin anxiously awaited 
Johnson’s reply.58  The ambassador recalled to his sheer amazement that: 
 
President Johnson listened carefully, but apparently, he did not 
immediately appreciate the significance of the news.  Much to my surprise 
he did not react to it at all, just thanked me for the information and said 
that he would probably discuss the statement with Rusk and others the 
next morning and give us a reply, if need be….  He proceeded to another 
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subject, on which he seemed much keener.  He said he was awaiting our 
response to his plans to announce his visit to the Soviet Union…. Still 
utterly oblivious of the impact of what was happening in Prague, Johnson 
asked us to give him a reply about his visit to Moscow in time for the next 
morning’s meetings… Johnson then reverted to his [earlier small talk]… 
offered me a whisky… and began to tell me various entertaining stories 
about Texas.59 
 
Ironically, it was Rostow, the only other person present during the conversation, who 
showed any emotion.  Dobrynin recalled that his facial expression grew solemn, and that 
he lowered his head.  Contrary to Johnson, Rostow did not remain as friendly and genial, 
and no doubt understood, (or at least showed that he understood), the seriousness and 
grave implications of the Soviet decision to invade.60 
 A hastily assembled National Security Council meeting held late at night on 
August 20, 1968 reinforced the fact that the invasion caught President Johnson and many 
of his staff off guard.  Secretary of State Rusk opened the meeting by bluntly saying, 
“This surprises me.”  Both Secretary Clark and General Earle Wheeler, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred.  When President Johnson finally spoke, he stated that 
the purpose of the meeting was to “determine what our national interest is,” and to give 
thought to the timing of any meetings with the Soviet leadership.  Johnson was seemingly 
not concerned with bridge building anymore.  Instead, the President was worried about 
saving face and achieving his nuclear arms summit.  Secretary Rusk approved, and 
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implied that the whole event was really not that significant, when he said that the United 
States should “not move ahead in the next day or so” with any concrete actions in 
response to the assault on Czechoslovakia.61   
 Secretary Rusk did however move forward that night with a response to 
Ambassador Dobrynin.  The Ambassador recalled that Rusk remained calm and 
composed as he read a message that called into question the feasibility of a summit in 
light of the invasion.  What struck Dobrynin most though was Johnson’s almost foolish 
insistence and hope for a summit meeting (eventual if not immediate) in Moscow.62  This 
singular focus on the part of the President of the United States really emphasized where 
his priorities stood.  The Politburo hardly expected Johnson to react so nonchalantly, and 
it certainly did not expect that the President would continue to push for a summit.63  
Instead of immediately condemning the invasion, as expected, the American leadership 
seemed confused and dazed, especially within the first 24 hours after receiving word of 
the Warsaw Pact’s moves.  More forceful rhetoric would soon be forthcoming, but the 
United States’, or at least the President’s, initial detached reactions and views on    
August 20 to the invasion would largely remained unchanged.   
 Even though President Johnson began August 21 with a somewhat more 
determined attitude than he exhibited twelve hours ago, he did not do much about the 
previous day’s events.  Early in the morning, the President made important telephone 
calls to governmental officials, and worked on a statement that he delivered to the nation 
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later in the day.64  In it, he condemned the invasion, called for UN action, and requested a 
full withdrawal of the occupying forces.65  Secretary Rusk held a news conference that 
day as well.  He reiterated many of the President’s points, calling for “reason,” 
“responsibility,” and “hope.”  He also made clear that the United States felt the situation 
was not “a direct responsibility of [theirs],” and that they had no “commitments to 
Czechoslovakia.”66  Here again, evidence of a disconnect between the past rhetoric and 
actions towards Czechoslovakia, and what emerged after the invasion can be seen clearly.  
The U.S. ignored the principles of many of the presidential doctrines, and of the actions 
of institutions such as Radio Free Europe.  Although it is certainly true that the United 
States had no formal treaty obligations with Czechoslovakia, the U.S. had made 
commitments and invested resources in the country in the form of Radio Free Europe, 
bridge building, and the general attitudes and actions of past administrations, including 
the Johnson administration.  The administration however was now definitely 
downplaying the significance of the invasion, and seemingly writing off Czechoslovakia 
to facilitate Johnson’s attempts to convene a summit with Soviet leaders.  Especially 
Johnson and Rusk’s rhetoric and actions in the days to come would largely mirror such 
sentiments and continue to be reminiscent of the White House’s initial reactions.   
 The following day, August 22, the President held a cabinet meeting to discuss the 
invasion.  The meeting primarily was concerned with how the cabinet members should 
handle the press, and with what the implications of the invasion would be.  However, the 
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President also illustrated his personal thinking on the events.  He admitted that he had 
been disillusioned, if not outright deceived by the Soviets on notions of peace and 
cooperation.  Johnson lamented the fact that “the cold war [was] not over,” and that 
communism had not somehow evolved from its earlier Stalinist convictions.  Importantly, 
the President did signify that U.S.-Soviet relations, and particularly the nuclear arms 
summit meeting, were still of “mutual interest,” and implied that those interests were still 
quite important, and even the most important consideration when formulating a policy 
and response to the attack on Czechoslovakia.67  Given the context of Vietnam and 
international tensions, his emphasis on such a policy was of the utmost importance.  
Thus, Johnson indicated that in order to keep alive the prospects of détente and a summit 
meeting, the United States would pursue a path that would not endanger those goals.     
 Another cabinet meeting on August 23 devoted part of its time to the 
Czechoslovak crisis.  Much of the discussion centered on the effectiveness of the Warsaw 
Pact’s military maneuvers, and on the growing fear in the U.S. that the Soviet Union was 
actively working to substantially increase its military might.  To counter such 
developments, General Wheeler suggested that President Johnson use the invasion as an 
excuse to maintain, if not increase, the U.S. military presence in Europe.  One of the 
other major decisions to come out of this meeting was the assessment that “the most 
powerful weapon” to use against the Soviets would be a “highly mobilized and charged 
world reaction.”  Secretary Rusk felt the Soviets were especially susceptible to 
propaganda and negative world opinion.  George Ball, the U.S. Ambassador to the United 
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Nations, agreed.68  Therefore, given their proclivity for only UN action, the U.S. 
continued to pursue that path.  The Johnson administration was determined not to 
undertake any other measures during its remaining few months that could jeopardize the 
President’s hopes for continuing to push forward a policy of détente and reconciliation 
with the Soviet leaders.   
  
THE RESPONSE BY NATO AND THE UN  
Johnson may have committed the country to taking action in the United Nations, 
but unfortunately, that did not ensure anything of substance would emerge.  Furthermore, 
most people in his administration acknowledged this.  Thus, it is either ironic or 
incredibly cynical that America voiced by far its harshest criticisms and condemnations 
of the invasion in this forum.  Ambassador Ball delivered not one, but two statements 
before the UN on August 21, calling the invasion an “affront to all civilized sensibilities” 
and a direct violation of the United Nations’ Charter.  He continued to say that the 
Soviet’s justification for the intervention was “an inept and obvious fraud,” and that the 
invasion must elicit “disgust and revulsion.”  Ambassador Ball ended his first speech by 
calling upon the world to demand the immediate withdrawal of Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
forces from Czechoslovakia.69  In his statement later that same day, Ball glorified the 
modern history of Czechoslovakia, and emphasized its tendency and tenacity for 
democracy and survival.  He continued to express vociferous support for the country and 
people of Czechoslovakia, and again urged that the UN work to “lift the dark shadow 
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now descended upon this small nation.”70  The speech delivered on August 22 continued 
to denounce the Soviet Union for being “cynically engaged in the rape of 
[Czechoslovakia],” while on August 23, Ball lambasted the Soviet veto of a resolution 
condemning the invasion.  Additionally that day, he suggested that UN Secretary-General 
U Thant create a special delegation to guarantee the safety and security of 
Czechoslovakia’s now imprisoned leaders.71  However, even though the White House 
condemned the invasion in the UN, they knew that little if anything would come of it, 
largely because such rhetoric was acknowledged as cliché and purely political.  Within 
such a large forum, Johnson felt that the risk of seriously upsetting the Soviets was 
minimal, and that since his administration did have to respond in some way, the UN 
would be the best place to do it.   
 Although the United Nations placed the invasion on its agenda, much like the 
White House predicted, the UN “did not take, or even consider, any… effective or 
forceful measures.”  The Security Council met on August 21, and voted to discuss the 
issue (the Soviet Union and Hungary voted against the measure).  Although ten countries, 
including the United States, voted in favor of a resolution that condemned the invasion as 
a violation of the UN Charter and called for a withdrawal of the occupying forces, the 
Soviets used their veto power and prevented the resolution’s adoption.  The Canadians 
attempted to continue the debate however by introducing a new proposition requesting 
that the Secretary-General send a special envoy to Prague to assess the situation and 
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ensure the safety and wellbeing of the Czechoslovak leadership.  By this time though, the 
Soviets fully controlled the Czechoslovak leadership, which then proceeded to request 
that the UN dismiss the matter.  No other resolutions or initiatives were put forth by any 
members of the UN, and within only a few days after the invasion, the subject was 
essentially dead.72  By letting the debate terminate, the U.S. showed that although it was 
willing to engage in rhetoric (albeit superficially), it was not willing to act or take any 
measures that might harm relations, or jeopardize Johnson’s overall goal of détente.                     
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the other major international 
organization through which the United States could have acted, did even less than the 
United Nations.  Although the invasion certainly sent “shivers” through Western Europe 
and NATO, they gave little response to the events of late August, in large part because 
they feared provoking a Soviet response.73  Members of NATO cautiously condemned 
the assault on Czechoslovakia’s sovereignty, but a West German request for an 
immediate NATO conference to discuss the matter went unfulfilled.  In addition, NATO 
refused even to put its forces on alert.74  There was a great fear among many in NATO 
and the diplomatic circles that any alliance response would be counterproductive because 
it could be seen as biased, inflammatory, and indicative of continuing cold war tensions.  
NATO wanted to minimize any chance of a confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, and so 
the alliance kept quiet.75  Furthermore, there was fear that NATO action might detract 
from the United Nation’s response.  The French Foreign Minister is reported to have said 
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that there was no need for another “meaningless doctrine” that would only be a useless 
waste of time and effort.76  Therefore, the NATO alliance’s reaction to the Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia was minimal.  Although there would be significant 
consequences for the structure and functioning of NATO in the future, in the immediate 
aftermath of Czechoslovakia’s occupation, the alliance remained tightlipped.  A desire 
not to exacerbate the situation, but predominantly an overriding fear of antagonizing the 
Soviets, led to NATO’s acquiescence. 
 
THE INVASION AND THE U.S. CONGRESS 
The White House, NATO, and the UN may have been halfhearted in their 
responses to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but the U.S. Congress, and to a large extent 
the U.S. public, were not apathetic to Czechoslovakia’s plight.  Many in the House of 
Representative and Senate vociferously denounced the Warsaw Pact’s move, and called 
on the President to respond in an assertive manner.  The invasion consumed, at least for a 
few days, the U.S. media, which gave ample coverage to the events and served as a forum 
for voicing solidarity with the Czechoslovaks.  The general population, and especially 
those of Czech, Slovak, or Eastern European descent, held rallies and demonstrations to 
voice their displeasure with the invasion and the U.S. response.  Overall, the response by 
Congress and the media served as a glaring counter to President Johnson, and 
demonstrated that the White House did not necessarily undertake the policies that many 
in the country desired. 
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Early in the day on August 23, President Johnson met with about twenty 
congressional leaders to discuss the invasion of Czechoslovakia.  Many in Congress used 
the invasion as a platform to appear staunchly anti-Soviet and to appeal to their 
constituents, and thus the meeting did not go well for the President, who was sharply 
chastised and given “a hard time” about his mild criticism of the Soviets and Warsaw 
Pact nations.77  The congressional representatives wanted a much tougher response, and 
more forceful action.  Two days later, there was another meeting with congressional 
leaders, and this time it was even more contentious.  The legislative and executive 
branches were trying to coordinate and agree upon an appropriate course of action to 
take.  Again, the Congress was much more bellicose than Johnson who, at one point, 
angrily and desperately exclaimed, “Are you suggesting that we send American troops 
there?”  Both sides certainly realized that military intervention was out of the question, 
but such an outburst of emotion demonstrated the vast differences in opinion both sides 
held.  The President was also probably tired, stressed, and upset about being put on the 
defensive.78  It is important to remember, however, that there is no doubt that it was 
certainly easy for individual members of Congress to demand harsh action, especially 
since they were not the ones who would actually have to order it, or take the blame for a 
failure.  Furthermore, with the presidential election just weeks away, there was certainly a 
great deal of political posturing.  These considerations aside though, in the days and 
weeks following the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia, the Congress still passed 
numerous bills, resolutions, and pieces of legislation, and members continued to 
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demonstrate in both print and in person their disdain at the events occurring in 
Czechoslovakia.   
H. Con. Res. 813 was one of the many resolutions put forth by the Congress that 
expressed outrage with the Warsaw Pact, and communicated concern for the wellbeing of 
the citizens of Czechoslovakia.  Other resolutions, namely H. Res. 1290, H. Res. 1291, H. 
Res. 1292, H. Res. 1293, H. Res. 1294, and H. Res. 1296 all condemned the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, and sought the involvement of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.79  One 
piece of legislation of particular significance though, was Senate Resolution 387.  The 
introduction to this resolution denounced the “treacherous invasion,” lamented the loss of 
Czechoslovakia’s “brave new freedom” which had emerged out of its “totalitarian night,” 
and claimed that there was “no essential difference between the communism of Brezhnev 
and Kosygin and the communism of Joseph Stalin.”  The individual articles of the 
resolution called for the administration to better “deal with the Czechoslovak crisis.”  
They also called for “the imposition of economic sanctions against the aggressor 
countries,” the removal of foreign soldiers from Czechoslovak territory, the establishment 
of a special United Nations committee to “gather information,” and the “immediate 
embargo” of all industrial and technological equipment bound for the Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact states that took part in the invasion.  S. Res. 387 concluded by stating that 
the White House needed to demonstrate solidarity with the Czechoslovak people, and 
made clear that the Senate would support all the measures listed within the resolution.80  
                                                
79. U.S. Congress, Congressional Record-Extensions of Remarks, September 5, 1968, 25861, 
HeinOnline, http://www.heinonline.org.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/HOL/Page?handle =hein.congrec/ 
cr1140020&id=1&size=2& collection=congrec&index=congrec/crei#117, (accessed February 19, 2010).  
80. “Senate Resolution 387,” U.S. Congress, Congressional Record-Senate, September 5, 1968, 25757, 
HeinOnline,   http://www.heinonline.org.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/HOL/Page? handle=hein.congrec/ 
cr1140020&id =1&size=2&collection=congrec&index=congrec/crei#13 (accessed February 19, 2010).  
Roth 36 
Thus, between the Congress’ meetings with the President, and all of the resolutions and 
pieces of legislation that it passed, many of America’s legislators made obvious their 
stance on the invasion of Czechoslovakia.  They illustrated not only what they wanted 
done in response to it, but also how they felt about the Johnson administration’s handling 
of matters. 
In addition to passing resolutions, Congressional representatives voiced their 
frustration on the floors of the House and Senate.  The Hon. Glenn Cunningham, a 
Republican from Nebraska, called Johnson’s approach to the crisis “halfhearted,” and 
complained that he was too focused on appeasing the Soviets and obtaining a summit 
meeting with them.81  The Hon. Edward Derwinski (R-IL) stated that in his opinion the 
West was too defensive, and gave the Russians carte blanche to intervene in 
Czechoslovakia.  He argued that there should have been some sort of gesture by the 
United States to deter the Soviets and make them think twice about the implications and 
consequences of an invasion on U.S.-Soviet relations.82  However, not all members of 
Congress and political leaders held the same opinions.  Gerald Ford, at that time the 
House Minority leader, referred to the events in Czechoslovakia as “a communist family 
struggle,” and said, “We shouldn’t get mixed up in [it],” out of a fear of Soviet reaction 
and potential diplomatic repercussions.83  Even presidential-candidate Nixon said (albeit 
before the invasion), that caution and sensitivity were required when dealing with the 
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emerging Czechoslovak crisis, and that “saying anything would not be helpful.”84  
However, many of Ford and Nixon’s contemporary politicians disagreed, at least 
publicly, and made their opinions known.       
Some members of Congress did more than deliver speeches and help pass 
legislation.  Many traveled to their home districts to garner popular support for 
Czechoslovakia and lead rallies and demonstrations.  The Hon. William Minshall (R-OH) 
was in Cleveland on August 23, and helped lead a pro-Czechoslovak rally at that city’s 
Bohemian National Hall.  Following his return to Washington, D.C. and Congress, he 
discussed his experiences with other members to gain yet more support.85  The Hon. 
Roman Pucinski (D-IL) went to Chicago to address and help lead a rally there that was 
protesting the occupation of Czechoslovakia.  Mr. Pucinski, in addition to harshly 
denouncing the aggressors and expressing solidarity and concern for the Czechs and 
Slovaks, also called upon the U.S. government to be “firm and resolute.”  Furthermore, 
he specifically suggested that President Johnson suspend or greatly limit diplomatic and 
economic ties with the countries involved in the occupation.  Economic sanctions, he 
contended, were powerful weapons.86  Although these leaders’ actions could potentially 
be written off as mere politicking, the fact remains that overall, and even across both 
party lines, the response in the halls of Congress was forceful and vocal.  It certainly may 
have been easier for someone without the responsibilities of the President or his top staff 
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to be more aggressive and to take such a stance, but that does not mean that they had to 
do so.  The fact that many did, helps clue us in to the overall mood of the country, a 
mood reinforced not only by Congress, but by the media and public as well.           
 
THE AMERICAN MEDIA RESPONSE  
Once Soviet and Warsaw Pact tanks and troops entered Czechoslovakia on 
August 20, the American media, predominantly the major newspapers, responded in an 
overwhelming manner.  The events occurring in Czechoslovakia, for a short time at least, 
transfixed America’s attention, and clearly elicited sympathy for the Czechs and Slovaks.  
Americans felt that at least before communism, Czechoslovakia embodied the same 
political values as the United States.  Furthermore, the American public applauded the 
Prague Spring’s transformations and liberalizations.87  A study of the 1968 New York 
Times illustrated the extent to which the press was devoted to coverage of 
Czechoslovakia.  More than 1200 articles over the course of the year were devoted to that 
country, with the majority coming in July, August, and September.  Furthermore, an 
impressive 215 of those articles appeared on the front page of the newspaper.  In other 
terms, averaged out over the course of the entire year, almost six out of ten New York 
Times front pages featured an article about Czechoslovakia.  Although of all the major 
U.S. newspapers, the New York Times by far devoted the most coverage to 
Czechoslovakia, the Wall Street Journal had fifty page-one articles dealing with events in 
that country, and the Christian Science Monitor had sixty-one.  Articles often dealt with 
the personalities of the leaders, and of the actual events of the invasion, but many times 
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dealt with U.S. and world reaction.88  For instance, the New York Times ran articles with 
titles such as “The U.S. Stays on Its Side of the Line.”89  The Washington Post displayed 
displeasure with the course of events as well, with an article titled, “For Lack of Good 
Will,” that argued against showing “good will” towards the Soviets in light of the 
invasion.90  In addition to stories, the newspapers had letters and editorials as well.  
Occasionally the letters defended President Johnson’s response, but more often than not, 
they mirrored the overall tone of the newspapers, and criticized the way that the United 
States handled the situation. 
 The New York Times was a primary location for many of these editorials.  It often 
contained very inflammatory rhetoric, and helped to serve as an outlet for the (liberal) 
public’s emotion.  “Russians, Go Home!” appeared in the New York Times on August 22, 
and attacked not only the “illegal and immoral conquest of Czechoslovakia,” but also 
“weak and inadequate reactions.”  It went on to chastise the President for waiting too 
long to address the nation after the invasion, and for not taking quicker action in the 
United Nations.91  “How Could They Do It?” appeared in the Washington Post.  It 
discussed the displeasure of the Czech-American community to the White House’s 
response to the invasion.92  Editorials and letters are by their very nature judgmental, 
biased, and often times politically charged, but because such a significant majority 
sympathized with the Czechoslovaks and voiced displeasure with the White House’s 
response, it is not inappropriate to use them to judge to a certain degree the general 
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attitude of the American population.  Public opinion managed to exhibit itself in other 
mediums too.  Political cartoons and caricatures also voiced frustration and displeasure 
with the course of events, and often conveyed just as powerful a message as did articles 
and editorials. 
 Many of the political cartoons that emerged during the Czechoslovak crisis 
portrayed the Czechs and Slovaks as helpless victims caught up in the larger power 
struggles and politics of the Cold War, and in the course of a tragic history often 
repeated.  The Chicago Sun Times published a cartoon depicting a small solitary figure 
trying to stop a tank with the Soviet flag painted on the side right next to a Nazi flag.  The 
tank had already crushed several people.  The caption reads, “Invasion of Czechoslovakia 
II,” thus comparing the Soviet invasion to the Nazi invasion in 1938.93  Another cartoon 
that appeared in the Washington Post depicted a savage Russian soldier trampling the 
body of a figure representing Czechoslovakia while Hitler and Stalin look on 
approvingly.94  Other cartoons focused more on the diplomatic and political repercussions 
of the invasion.  Cleveland’s Plain Dealer featured a cartoon on August 22 that portrayed 
the Soviets as the traditional and symbolic Russian bear.  The bear was rabid, and 
clutched a variety of bones, upon which “East-West Relations” was written.  The caption 
read, “Détente, heck, I was only hibernating.”95  Yet another cartoon satirized the 
lackadaisical U.S. and Western response.  It displayed the United Nations building with a 
face on it, but the mouth of the face had a gag over it.  The caption said there was “all 
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quiet on the Western front.”96  Thus, even through political cartoons, it is clear that the 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion, and U.S. response, was viewed with displeasure by 
many in America.  The fact that a great deal of the content in American newspapers 
during the end of August of 1968 displayed solidarity with the Czechoslovaks and 
displeasure with America’s response, demonstrates that many in the country felt 
differently from those in the White House.  Rather than ignoring the plight of an entire 
country to further personal and political goals, a large percentage of the American people 
felt some kind of action was needed, and that the policies exhibited thus far by the United 
States were unacceptable.     
 
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
The fact that there were differing opinions on how to handle the situation 
ultimately did not effect what the outcomes and consequences of the invasion would be.  
Although the Democratic National Convention, presidential election, and continuing 
conflict in Vietnam soon overshadowed the Czechoslovak crisis, the invasion nonetheless 
may have had important domestic political consequences.  The invasion’s consequences 
on international diplomacy however, including relations between the U.S. and NATO and 
the U.S. and the Soviets, were much more visible and significant. 
Domestically, the invasion probably did little more than arouse public anger at the 
Soviet Union and its allies.  However, there is some evidence to suggest that it may have 
helped increase Richard Nixon and the Republican’s popularity at the expense of Hubert 
Humphrey and the Democrats in the 1968 presidential election, because the invasion 
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reaffirmed many Americans’ beliefs that the Soviet Union was still a military threat.97    
Since many considered Nixon and the Republicans as being tougher on communism, they 
were able to use the invasion to their political advantage.98  A 1968 Harris Poll concluded 
that the American people were once again convinced of the bellicose nature of the Soviet 
Union, and that the “Cold War was on all over again.”99  Additionally, the Gallup Poll 
registered major drops in popularity for the Democrats during the period following the 
invasion, while the republicans gained in popularity.  Specifically, an August 25 poll 
showed that 41% of Americans now felt that Republicans could better secure peace for 
America, as opposed to only 23% who felt that the Democrats could.100  Additionally, 
comments by such prominent democrats as Eugene McCarthy who said that the invasion 
was “not a major crisis” hurt the party’s image.101  The Republicans and Nixon used the 
invasion to their advantage.  They immediately realized that they could use the Soviet 
action to strengthen their position.  Frank Shakespeare, one of Nixon’s publicists, 
exclaimed after hearing the news of the invasion, “What a break!  This Czech thing is just 
perfect.  It puts the soft-liners in a hell of a box!”102  Humphrey seemed to feel the same 
way, acknowledging privately that news of the invasion had made things “more turbulent 
and more difficult—for me and for the Democratic Party.”103  Although there were of 
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course many other issues and factors that went into the presidential election of 1968, 
(such as Vietnam), given the vociferous and passionate response by many in the 
American public to the invasion, and to their general discontent with the way President 
Johnson handled the United States’ foreign policy, it is conceivable some may have 
switched their support to Nixon, helping to boost his campaign for president.   
 One of the invasion’s two major international implications that concerned the 
United States had to do with U.S.-NATO relations.  In the year prior to the invasion, 
there had been a large-scale movement within the U.S. Congress to divest militarily and 
financially from involvement in Western Europe.  Both the Mansfield Resolution and the 
Symington Amendment were trying to force major American troop withdrawals from 
Europe.104  The Europeans as well seemed to be scaling back their efforts at maintaining 
NATO.  The most obvious example was General Charles de Gaulle and the French 
withdrawal from NATO’s military command in 1966, but even the West Germans had 
recently shown reluctance to keep spending on the alliance.105  However, as soon as the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia took place, the issue of NATO cutbacks became moot.  The 
Brezhnev Doctrine along with the realization that Moscow would still resort to violence 
dramatically demonstrated that the role and necessity of NATO had not diminished.  The 
Johnson administration, perhaps surprisingly given its disinterest in using NATO to 
respond to the invasion, had always been in favor of maintaining the alliance’s power.  
Secretary of Defense Clifford credited the Czechoslovak crisis for actually saving NATO 
and allowing the U.S. to reassert its dominance in Western Europe.106  The alliance’s 
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European members realized that their security was dependent upon NATO, and after the 
invasion, they critically evaluated their military preparedness.  They determined that 
NATO had lost its military edge, and so began to improve the “quality, effectiveness, and 
deployment of NATO’s forces… in order to provide a better capability for defense.”  The 
Western Europeans were thus roused from their lethargy, and responded by increasing 
not only their military expenditures, but manpower commitments as well.  With the 
United States again taking a leading role, NATO soon became a revamped and revitalized 
alliance.107  Although NATO’s response to the invasion demonstrated a certain level of 
political and military weakness, the events in Czechoslovakia provided the spark 
necessary for the required changes, and ultimately led to a restructuring and 
recommitment by the member states that improved the alliance’s strength. 
 In addition to the impact on U.S.-NATO relations, the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
affected America’s relations with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries.  
However, the Johnson administration’s response to the invasion kept the diplomatic 
consequences to a minimum.  Because of the overriding priority of improving both the 
situation in Vietnam and the prospects for détente, the White House did nothing of 
substance to reproach the Soviets, and therefore did not harm relations.  In fact, aside 
from Czechoslovakia and its citizens, Johnson himself arguably suffered the most from 
the few temporary setbacks that did occur.  The President had to postpone his planned 
arms-reduction summit meeting so as not to be seen as too condoning of the invasion, and 
the Senate, because of its “mood… with Moscow” did not approve the Nuclear 
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Nonproliferation Treaty.108  Johnson had hoped that these two items would be the 
capstone of his presidency, and that they would positively affect his legacy.  Instead, 
much to his dismay, both measures came to fruition early in Nixon’s presidency.  
Another setback in relations was the discontinuation of bridge building, but this too was 
only temporary.  As early as November of 1968, a mere three months after the invasion, 
détente and building better relations was once again a priority, and by November of the 
following year, significant progress had been made.109  The White House publicly 
admitted that there was “no change” in its policy towards Moscow following the 
invasion.110  Ultimately, it was only an “inconvenient bump on the road to détente.”  The 
Johnson White House clearly knew its priorities and assistance—either moral or 
otherwise to Czechoslovakia—was not important.111  This detached policy may have 
prevented an escalation in East-West tensions and the continued hope for progress 
towards détente, but it also signaled a strategic defeat for the United States.  Occupied by 
factors such as the Vietnam War, the country relegated its past actions and rhetoric to the 
sidelines, and inaction came to the forefront.  An episode of, at worst, political 
incompetency, and at best, strategic indifference, manifested itself in the White House in 
the second half of 1968.  
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ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES  
Alternative opinions existed that posited that the United States could have 
responded differently to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in ways that could have avoided 
both war and a major breakdown in relations.  Direct military action was undoubtedly not 
an option, but implementing varying levels and forms of diplomatic action such as 
sanctions or more forceful rhetoric were, and were proposed by Congressional 
Representatives, diplomats and other government officials, newspaper editors, émigrés, 
and many others.  However, Johnson decided against taking the path of aggressive 
diplomacy.  Concern and preoccupation with the overriding conflict in Vietnam and with 
nuclear arms limitation certainly helped style his response, but much of the responsibility 
for the United States’ inaction regarding the invasion must still fall upon Johnson’s 
shoulders.  By examining and understanding both his political and personal goals (within 
the larger context of Vietnam), it is possible to surmise why he acted, felt, and responded 
as he did, and why the White House responded as it did. 
Almost no one contends that the United States should have responded militarily to 
the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia.  The U.S. and NATO were woefully 
unprepared for any outbreak of hostilities in Europe.  The Western powers faced a “less 
than desirable level of battle-readiness,” along with “shortfalls in men and material.”112  
Of course, Vietnam also had the United States bogged down.  Furthermore, Secretary of 
State Rusk made it very clear that any Western military intervention “would mean World 
War III,” and “nuclear war.”113  Obviously, no one was willing to go to such extremes for 
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the sake of Czechoslovakia’s political freedom, nor does this paper suggest that they 
should have.   
However, President Johnson and his administration could have taken specific 
measures to better respond to, or perhaps even prevent, the violent invasion of 
Czechoslovakia.  The threat of sanctions in the UN, warnings about the negative effects 
on U.S.-Soviet relations and projects, and rhetoric that emphasized such consequences 
were some of the avenues available to White House policy makers.  In fact, this is largely 
the course of action that the U.S. Congress recommended, and additionally, is what many 
newspapers and prominent individuals proposed.  Instead, Johnson decided not to employ 
these measures, largely out of either an unpreparedness, or unwillingness to do so.  The 
result was that President Johnson came off as both unconcerned with Czechoslovakia and 
even complicit in its conquest.  Many in the Congress and public concluded that he was 
too focused on not only détente, but on his narrow personal and political agenda (such as 
improving his legacy) to respond properly to a major international crisis. 
An irony about the events surrounding the invasion of Czechoslovakia is that an 
incident that arose during that crisis demonstrated that the United States perhaps could 
have effectively used much tougher diplomacy.  Romania refused take part in the 
Warsaw Pact invasion and its liberal (at least at that time) leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, 
vehemently denounced the violation of Czechoslovakia’s sovereignty.  Such a stance 
upset the hard-liners in Moscow, who had just invaded Czechoslovakia to suppress 
among other things anti-Soviet sentiment.  Their response was to begin to amass Soviet 
and other Warsaw Pact troops along the border with Romania, in an apparent indication 
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of a possible invasion.  U.S. intelligence services became aware of these troop 
movements, and alerted the White House.  On August 28, a greatly alarmed and 
defensive President Johnson (he was still taking criticism from all sides over his handling 
of the Czechoslovak situation) instructed Secretary of State Rusk to discuss this matter 
with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.  The Secretary firmly warned Dobrynin that any 
move against Romania would have serious consequences.114  On August 30, President 
Johnson addressed this issue himself when he said during a speech in San Antonio that a 
Soviet move against Romania might “unleash the dogs of war.”115  Also on August 30, 
Secretary Rusk again summoned Dobrynin to see him.  Rusk warned the Ambassador yet 
again about the severe consequences that a move into Romania would have, and said, “he 
wished in the name of all humanity” that another invasion not occur because its results 
“would be incalculable.”116  It is clear that these warnings quickly registered with the 
Kremlin, because later that same day Dobrynin delivered a message assuring the U.S. that 
there would be no attack on Romania.117  This instance of forceful diplomacy backed by 
strong rhetoric, and even threats, appears to have resonated with the Soviets and averted 
another invasion.  Given that the White House was successful in helping to stave off a 
threat to Romania, the question naturally arises as to whether such warnings about the 
implications of an invasion of Czechoslovakia could have persuaded the Soviets to act 
differently.  Of course, no one can know, but it is certainly not impossible to posit that the 
Soviet leaders might have acted differently and without force had the American 
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government made them fear the consequences of an attack on Czechoslovakia.  The 
action with Romania demonstrated that firm diplomacy still worked with the Soviets, and 
suggests that had it been used before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, events might have 
transpired differently. 
However, even after the invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred, the United States 
could have responded differently.  Instead of responding with cliché rhetoric and action, 
the White House could have been more assertive.  Such action would not have had to 
constitute a threat to world peace, nor even result in major setbacks in U.S.-Soviet 
relations.  The United States did have some economic and political leverage that it did not 
employ against the Soviets, who even in the worst political climates probably would not 
have severed relations with America.118  Aside from rhetorically standing up more 
forcefully for Czechoslovakia’s sovereignty, the U.S. could have intentionally cut back 
on cultural and economic ties with the invading countries.  Senate Resolution 387 
proposed such measures, proving that such ideas were widespread and well received.  
Although relatively speaking, there was not much economic cooperation to begin with, 
cutting what did exist could have been significant for the aggressors, especially in the 
areas of technology and agriculture.  At the same time, the U.S. could have extended 
economic and cultural inducements to Yugoslavia and Romania, further supporting the 
more independent nations.  Additionally, the U.S. could have suspended bilateral projects 
of particular interest to the Soviets, such as civil air agreements and consular 
conventions.  Notably, many upper level State Department officials advocated these types 
of measures.  In the wake of a violent invasion, they said that it should be realistic to 
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expect that cultural exchanges, technology sharing agreements, and even arms 
negotiations would suffer setbacks.119   
The White House could have pursued other multilateral actions.  American 
pressure in the United Nations, especially within the General Assembly where the Soviets 
did not have a veto, might have resulted in resolutions that provided at least moral if not 
humanitarian aid.  Even sanctions might have been a possibility.  Had the U.S. and 
Western allies pushed the issue further, perhaps they could have accomplished more, 
even if it merely related to assisting refugees or having neutral observers monitor the 
situation.  The State Department was active in pursuing such options, and had even 
prepared contingency papers to help guide U.S. action in the UN.120  Because of 
Johnson’s inaction, “even less was done than in the Hungarian crisis in 1956,” in which 
the UN faced criticism for its lack of action.121  
NATO officials also discussed how more could have been done to respond to the 
attack.  Certainly, military action would have been imprudent, but stronger rhetoric could 
have applied pressure to the invaders, and at least let the public know of the alliance’s 
displeasure with the situation.  Furthermore, NATO could have scaled back it contacts 
with Warsaw Pact countries, and joined the United States in finding nonaggressive ways 
to reprimand the invaders.  West German Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger pushed for a NATO 
summit meeting to discuss what the alliance’s reaction should be, and if it would be wise 
to adopt such measures.122     
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Because the United States did not take more forceful and determined action 
following the invasion, it faced international criticism of collusion with the Soviets.123  
Although Western Europe as a whole reacted even more passively than did the U.S., the 
French, along with many in the third world, attacked the White House and the country for 
what they perceived as an acknowledgement of ‘spheres of influence.’  Even 
domestically, President Johnson and Secretary Rusk had to deny repeatedly that there 
was any sort of quid pro quo relating American passivity towards Czechoslovakia to 
Soviet passivity in Vietnam.124  Although there is no evidence to back up such 
accusations, they point to the larger failings of American policy in the days and weeks 
following the Czechoslovak crisis.  There may not have been formal collusion, but the 
United States pursued a policy of “hands off” inaction when confronted with the 
possibility of a Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.125  Such attitudes and policies, 
particularly as embodied by President Johnson, may very well have given the Soviets the 
impression that they could act with impunity.  Johnson’s broader attitudes and desires 
also helped to facilitate the Soviet and Warsaw Pact moves, and to a significant degree 
were responsible for the character of the White House’s reaction.   
 
CONCLUSION 
International factors such as Vietnam, domestic problems and unrest, and 
President Johnson’s personal politics and agenda must share the blame for a failed 
Czechoslovak policy.  Mired in Vietnam, very focused on arms limitation, and distracted 
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by politics at home, Johnson was unable to implement an effective or forceful response to 
Soviet aggression.  Aside from the larger context of Vietnam and domestic concerns, to 
understand why Johnson acted as he did, and why he responded so passively when the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred, one must examine his personal and political 
priorities.  By August of 1968 Johnson was a defeated and lame duck president who 
feared that the conflict in Vietnam would be his lasting legacy.  In order to try to avoid 
this, he attempted to gain one last major foreign policy victory.  He pushed hard and 
consistently for a summit with the Soviet leaders to discuss nuclear arms limitation.  
Johnson also hoped that a breakthrough with the Soviets could help solidify the 
beginnings of détente.  Because the President was strongly committed to peace and 
bilateral cooperation, he did not want to damage that process.  Ultimately, if being non-
confrontational about Czechoslovakia meant that Johnson could achieve his long sought 
after personal and political goals, then so be it. 
 Even beginning with the early days of his presidency, Lyndon Johnson made it 
clear that he was desirous of peace.  Within hours of taking the oath of office, he met 
with Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, and promised that “no day would go by in 
which I and my administration would not be working hard to ease world tensions and 
bring peace closer to us all.”126  This theme persisted throughout his tenure, with the 
President often making speeches promoting peace and cooperation, and warning of the 
consequences of war and hostilities.127  Towards the end of his time in office, including 
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during the Czechoslovak crisis, the President maintained his “desire to leave office as a 
peacemaker.”128 
 Clearly, one of President Johnson’s motives for reaching an agreement with the 
Soviets over nuclear arms was his desire for peace and cooperation not only in Vietnam, 
but between the two superpowers as well.  Many historians and politicians see the 
President as having pushed “desperately, even pathetically,” for a summit, even after the 
invasion.129  As early as September 5 1968, the President was already trying to reschedule 
his meeting with Moscow.  Johnson “displayed an unseemly eagerness to embrace the 
Soviet leadership in public,” and get something accomplished in his final weeks as 
President.  It was actually up to many of his staff and advisors to restrain him, and call for 
more discretion.  They feared that such a display of affection towards the Soviets so soon 
after the invasion would be a public relations and diplomatic disaster.130  Although 
Johnson had invested much into a meeting in Moscow, many have interpreted such a 
stubborn adherence to the notion of a summit as a mere attempt at public aggrandizement 
and legacy building.131  An agreement on nuclear arms reductions was certainly 
something the President honestly desired, but the extent to which he pursued it, and at the 
cost of other American interests (such as supporting democracy and liberalization) in 
Eastern Europe, not to mention Czechoslovakia, makes his stubbornness seem self-
serving.   
 It is clear from the administration’s actions that the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
was just not that important to them, at least given what else they were facing.  The 
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President was much more concerned with furthering détente, meeting with the Soviet 
leadership, passing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, building upon broader themes of 
peace, and yes, improving his tarnished legacy.  Détente and arms limitation were 
certainly very important, although they did not change the fact that for the past two 
decades the U.S. government had been engaged in both a public and covert war of 
support for the freedom and liberty of Eastern Europe, or that Johnson’s policies now 
clearly deviated from those past actions.  What is more, by attempting to court the favor 
and cooperation of the Soviets, Johnson jeopardized his own modest successes with 
bridge building.   
The dichotomy that emerged between past and current action probably is most 
apparent when recalling Johnson’s initial reaction to news of the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia.  As Ambassador Dobrynin recalled, Johnson was unmoved and 
seemingly uninterested.  He was instead more concerned about the prospects of his 
meeting with the Soviet leaders, and of engaging in banal small talk.132  Only after his 
staff prodded him into action did he respond, and then only with the bare minimum 
required to attempt to save face.   
The American Congress and public were outraged, but Johnson and the White 
House continued to cling to naïve hopes and desires.  President Johnson had many 
opportunities and means to respond differently and without leading to war or serious 
fallout in U.S.-Soviet relations, but he did not.  Because of this, he suffered comparisons 
to Neville Chamberlin’s Czechoslovak policy in 1938.133  Many came to regard Johnson 
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as a “hypocritical… Western liberal, who did not move a finger” to help 
Czechoslovakia.134  Johnson and the White House’s official policy of ‘no action’ and 
‘non-interference’ when it came to saving Czechoslovakia from aggression not only 
broke with America’s rhetorical precedent for dealing with Eastern Europe, but signaled 
to the Soviet Union that the Warsaw Pact had a green light to do as it pleased.  The 
invasion of Czechoslovakia unfortunately proved that President Johnson was ultimately 
unwilling and unable to respond effectively to this major European incident, and that the 
U.S. government once again demonstrated that rhetorical and even physical, concrete 
support for freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe did not mean that such support 
would manifest itself when it was most needed.   
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